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NOTES
Board has ruled that a petitioning union must have represented
the employees on a departmental basis in order to qualify to
sever such a unit. Or may such union qualify by having pre-
viously represented craft employees of the type to be included
in the departmental unit involved? If prior departmental repre-
sentation is a prerequisite, the effect would be to limit the pos-
sibilities of future departmental severance. But, if the answer
be that a union may qualify as well by having traditionally rep-
resented the department's skilled employees on a craft basis, the
number of unions which may qualify to sever "functionally dis-
tinct" departments is vastly increased.17
Daniel J. Shea
SALES - REAL ESTATE BROKERS - DUTY TO CONVEY
OFFERS TO CLIENTS
Defendant real estate firm was employed as agent to sell cer-
tain property. Plaintiff made several offers for the property
which were rejected by defendant but with the notation that
an offer of $9,500 would be acceptable. Although plaintiff there-
after submitted such an offer to defendant's salesman, the
latter, instead of communicating it to the owner, misrepresented
to him that another party's offer of $9,250 had been the highest.
As a result the property was sold for the lower offer. Plaintiff
sued the real estate firm and its salesman for the difference
between his offer of $9,500 and the price of $25,000 subsequently
asked for the property by the successful purchaser. The district
court sustained an exception of no cause of action on the theory
that no duty was owed to plaintiff by defendants. On appeal,
held, reversed. The statute regulating real estate brokerage im-
posed a duty on defendants to communicate plaintiff's offer of
$9,500 to the owner. Amato v. Latter and Blum, Inc., 227 La.
537, 79 So.2d 873 (1955).
The question presented by the instant case, whether a real
estate agent who has received an offer from a prospective pur-
chaser owes a duty to the latter to submit the offer to his prin-
17. In Friden Calculating Machine Co., and Marchant Calculators, Inc., 110
N.L.R.B. 1618 (1954), the Board held that in the case of a union newly organ-
ized for the specific purpose of representing the "craft" to be severed, the American
Potash requirement that the union seeking to sever the craft unit have a history
of representing the type of employees in question would not be applied. In all
probability the same rule would apply in the case of departmental severance.
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cipal, appears to be a novel one in Louisiana and at common law.
It is well established, both at common law and in the civil law,
that an agent is not responsible to a third person for failure to
perform a duty owed solely to his principal.' Thus, in the in-
stant case, the breach of the agent's duty to his principal to
secure the highest possible price seemingly would not render
the agent liable to a third party prospective vendee. Liability
of the agent 2 must result from the breach of some independent
duty owed by him to the prospective vendee. Common law courts
have been reluctant to find negligence from a simple failure to
act.8 But where a party has undertaken to perform an act and
then does it improperly, or has failed to complete the under-
taking after having begun performance, it is considered more
than a mere failure to act and recovery for negligence has been
allowed.4 On the other hand, if a party simply fails to keep a
promise to perform an act, no violation of a legal duty occurs at
common law unless consideration for the promise has been re-
ceived by the promisor. If, however, in consequence of a gra-
tuitous promise the promisee is led to act to his detriment, the
circumstances often call for relief. Thus, in one case a railroad
1. Knight v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 73 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Delaney
v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882) ; Therbone v. Cougot and Joubert, 3 La.
App. 771 (1926) ; Southern Ry. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244 (1906)
(dictum) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 357 (1933).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3016 (1870) provides: "The broker or intermediary is
he who is employed to negotiate a matter between two parties, and who, for that
reason, is considered as the mandatary of both." Where the courts have given
effect to this article to permit recovery against a real estate broker as the agent
of both parties, there has been a contract to purchase between the prospective pur-
chaser and the owner-vendor prior to the institution of suit. Dunn v. Spiro, 153
So. 316 (La. App. 1934) ; Smith v. Blache, 19 La. App. 594, 140 So. 147 (1932) ;
Izquierdo v. Kenner, 11 La. App. 594, 123 So. 366 (1929). These cases involved
actions by the prospective purchaser for the return of a deposit from the broker.
Likewise, in the case of a merchandise broker the courts have held that a broker
is primarily the agent of the person originally employing him and becomes the agent
of the other party only when a contract has been formed between the principals.
Woods, Slayback and Co. v. Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880) ; Apple Growers Ass'n
v. Kohlman Bros., 8 La. App. 165 (1928). It would thus seem that the broker
could not be held to be the agent of the prospective purchaser of real estate where
the negotiations have not passed the offer stage.
3. The celebrated case of Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809) appears
to be the leading case holding that no liability is incurred for a failure to act.
There the defendant, owner of a 1/2 interest in a ship at sea, promised gratuitously
to take out insurance on the vessel. He failed to do so and the ship was wrecked.
Noting that there was no consideration for the promise, the court held that one
undertaking gratuitously to do an act for another is not liable for failing to do the
act and is only responsible when he attempts to do it and does it in a faulty
manner.
4. Samonset v. Mesnager, 108 Cal. 354, 41 Pac. 337 (1895) ; Joslyn v. King,
27 Neb. 38, 42 N.W. 756 (1889) ; Hammond v. Hussey, 51 N.H. 40 (1871) ; Jones
v. Parish, 1 Pinney 494 (Wis. 1845).
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was held to have violated a legal duty by failing to send certain
papers to the Interstate Commerce Commission after having
promised gratuitously to do so. 5 The court held that the action
sounded in tort for negligence. It would seem that the instant
case presents an analogous situation and it might well be argued
that defendant in receiving plaintiff's offer for the purpose of
communicating it and then failing to do so was guilty of neg-
ligence for which he should be held liable." On the other hand,
it has been suggested that such a case properly falls into the
ambit of contract law on the theory that by promising to do
something defendant had caused plaintiff to rely thereon to his
detriment. 7 This concept has become known as the doctrine of
"promissory estoppel" and is based on the principle that if a
party who promises to do something gratuitously has reason to
know that the other party will rely thereon to his detriment, he
will be estopped to deny that his promise was supported by con-
sideration. Applied to the facts of the instant case, the view
might be taken that defendant, by receiving the offer, impliedly
promised to communicate it to his principal and, having thereby
led plaintiff to refrain from communicating it directly to the
owner, the doctrine of "promissory estoppel" should be applicable
to him and his employer. Whatever the proper basis for the
action should be in the case of detrimental reliance on a gra-
tuitous undertaking, whether tort or contract, the modern view
at common law appears to be that recovery should be allowed.
Under civilian principles, recovery in the instant case might
5. Carr v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 Atl. 532 (1917),
6. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 378 (1933) deals with the problem of gratuitous
undertakings, as limited to the agency situation, in terms of tort liability. It pro-
vides: "One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should
realize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the performance of definite
acts of service by him as the other's agent, causes the other to refrain from having
such acts done by other available means is subject to a duty to use care to perform
such service or, while other means are available, to give notice that he will not
perform." Illustration I of comment a thereunder appears to be substantially in
point with the instant case: "A, a real estate broker, knowing that P is desirous
of making a bid for Blackacre, tells P that he will make the bid for him. P gives
A a writing containing P's offer. At the time for the submission of bids, A fails
to present P's bid but presents the bids of others. P does not discover this until
too late to make another bid and thereby loses the chance of purchasing the land.
P's bid would have been successful. A is subject to liability to P for the loss
thereby caused."
7. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 207 (1950).
8. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) : "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action




conceivably have been allowed under either a contract or tort
theory. There should be no objection to enforcing a gratuitous
promise under Louisiana law if the requisites for a valid con-
tract are otherwise present. 9 Assuming that a promise by de-
fendant to submit the offer could be raised by implication from
the facts of the instant case, it would seem that such promise
was supported by a lawful cause and should therefore be en-
forceable against the promisor. Surely no question of form would
arise. Whatever cause or motive may have led the broker to
agree to communicate the offer, a donation was not intended.
Alternatively, it could be argued that defendants were liable in
tort under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code which pro-
vides: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to an-
other, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. .. ."
This provision was taken directly from article 1382 of the Code
Napoleon. Under French theory, fault consists in not conducting
oneself as one should; if a person contravenes this general obli-
gation of acting properly he is at fault.'0 Fault has been char-
acterized as the breach of a pre-existing obligation specified by
law or by contract or founded on general precepts of right and
morality," and may consist in a positive act or a failure to per-
form an act which should be performed. 12 All faults oblige a
reparation; that is, no one has the right to act with imprudence
without suffering the consequences of his act.'8 The actor's con-
duct is to be compared with that of another who would have
acted correctly under the circumstances, le bon pare de famille;
and if he does not act as this ideal man would, he is to be held
at fault.14 Applying these principles to the instant case defend-
ant could very easily be considered at fault by failing to submit
plaintiff's offer to the vendor, and thus might be held liable for
the resulting injury to plaintiff.
The statute regulating real estate brokerage, 15 on which the
9. The requisites are set out in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1779 (1870).
10. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITP, LLAMENTAIRE DE DROIT cIvIm no 913 (3d ed. 1949).
11. Ibid.
12. Id. no 951.
13. Id. nos 898, 904, 914.
14. Id. no 913.
15. LA. R.S. 37:1431-1459 (1950). Section 1447 provides that bond shall be
furnished with security in favor of the Governor by any person dealing in real
estate or rent collecting as agent or broker. This bond "shall be conditioned that
the agent or broker shall carry out the objects and purposes for which his agency,
office, or business has been established, and that the agent or broker shall honestly
conduct his business and pay all damages which may result from his actions as a
real estate agent or broker."
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court based its decision in the instant case, seems to be con-
sistent with civilian principles of tort liability by providing, in
part, that "anyone who is injured or damaged by the agent or
broker by any wrongful act done in the furtherance of such busi-
ness or by any fraud or misrepresentation by the agent or broker
may sue for the recovery of the damage before any court of com-
petent jurisdiction."' 0 The court found that the statute placed
real estate brokerage in the status of a public business, vested
with a public interest and subject to police regulation. This being
true, it reasoned that the defendant owed a duty to the public
and since the plaintiff was a member of the public, he was en-
titled to have his offer communicated by the defendants to the
vendor.I7 Although the court's action could perhaps be sustained
under other theories, both at common law and under civilian
principles, it is submitted that the ground on which the decision
was based, that of giving effect to the legislative policy of re-
quiring high standards of conduct by real estate agents, is sound.
Charles W. Howard, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - HAZARDOUS NATURE OF
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
Plaintiff, a saleslady and beauty operator employed by a
retail concessionaire aboard a steamship, was injured' and
brought suit under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act,2
alleging total and permanent disability. She contended that the
presence of the employer's concession aboard a steam-powered
vessel rendered it a hazardous business within the coverage of
the act, despite the fact that her employer neither owned nor
16. LA. R.S. 37:1447 (1950).
17. Cf. Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So.2d 4 (1946), cited by the majority
in the instant case. The court there found that the Florida statutes regulating
real estate brokerage created a duty of fair dealing to the plaintiff by the de-
fendant broker, inasmuch as the statutes granted a virtual monopoly to engage
in a lucrative business and required that applicants for brokerage licenses be
trustworthy, honest, and bear a reputation for fair dealing.
1. The sequence of events surrounding the accident were as follows: Plaintiff
was sunbathing on the ship's deck when, upon attempting to arise, a sudden roll
of the ship caused her to slip and fall. Such circumstances present very unusual
and somewhat difficult problems as to whether the injury was one "arising out
of" and "in the course of" the employment. The manner in which the court dis-
poses of these problems in granting recovery is very interesting, although un-
fortunately beyond the scope of this Note.
2. LA. R.S. 23:1021 et seq. (1950). For complete discussion of hazardous
businesses, see MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE c. 5 (1951).
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